A Planet at the
Brink
https://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=30626
Will Economic Brushfires Prove
Too Virulent to Contain?
The global economic meltdown has already
caused bank failures, bankruptcies, plant closings, and foreclosures and
will, in the coming year, leave many tens of millions unemployed across
the planet. But another perilous consequence of the crash of 2008 has only
recently made its appearance: increased civil unrest and ethnic strife.
Someday, perhaps, war may follow.
As people lose confidence
in the ability of markets and governments to solve the global crisis, they
are likely to erupt into violent protests or to assault others they deem
responsible for their plight, including government officials, plant
managers, landlords, immigrants, and ethnic minorities. (The list could,
in the future, prove long and unnerving.) If the present economic disaster
turns into what President Obama has referred to as a "lost decade," the
result could be a global landscape filled with economically-fueled
upheavals.
Indeed, if you want to be grimly impressed, hang a
world map on your wall and start inserting red pins where violent episodes
have already occurred. Athens (Greece), Longnan (China), Port-au-Prince
(Haiti), Riga (Latvia), Santa Cruz (Bolivia), Sofia (Bulgaria), Vilnius
(Lithuania), and Vladivostok (Russia) would be a start. Many other cities
from Reykjavik, Paris, Rome, and Zaragoza to Moscow and Dublin have
witnessed huge protests over rising unemployment and falling wages that
remained orderly thanks in part to the presence of vast numbers of riot
police. If you inserted orange pins at these locations -- none as yet in
the United States -- your map would already look aflame with activity. And
if you're a gambling man or woman, it's a safe bet that this map will soon
be far better populated with red and orange pins.
For the
most part, such upheavals, even when violent, are likely to remain
localized in nature, and disorganized enough that government forces will
be able to bring them under control within days or weeks, even if -- as
with Athens for six days last December -- urban paralysis sets in due to
rioting, tear gas, and police cordons. That, at least, has been the case
so far. It is entirely possible, however, that, as the economic crisis
worsens, some of these incidents will metastasize into far more intense
and long-lasting events: armed rebellions, military takeovers, civil
conflicts, even economically fueled wars between
states.
Every outbreak of violence has its own distinctive
origins and characteristics. All, however, are driven by a similar
combination of anxiety about the future and lack of confidence in the
ability of established institutions to deal with the problems at hand. And
just as the economic crisis has proven global in ways not seen before, so
local incidents -- especially given the almost instantaneous nature of
modern communications -- have a potential to spark others in far-off
places, linked only in a virtual sense.
A Global Pandemic of
Economically Driven Violence
The riots that erupted in the
spring of 2008 in response to rising food prices suggested the speed with
which economically-related violence can spread. It is unlikely that
Western news sources captured all such incidents, but among those recorded
in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal were riots in Cameroon,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, and
Senegal.
In Haiti, for example, thousands of protesters
stormed the presidential palace in Port-au-Prince and demanded food
handouts, only to be repelled by government troops and UN peacekeepers.
Other countries, including Pakistan and Thailand, quickly sought to deter
such assaults by deploying troops at farms and warehouses throughout the
country.
The riots only abated at summer's end when falling
energy costs brought food prices crashing down as well. (The cost of food
is now closely tied to the price of oil and natural gas because
petrochemicals are so widely and heavily used in the cultivation of
grains.) Ominously, however, this is sure to prove but a temporary
respite, given the epic droughts now gripping breadbasket regions of the
United States, Argentina, Australia, China, the Middle East, and Africa.
Look for the prices of wheat, soybeans, and possibly rice to rise in the
coming months -- just when billions of people in the developing world are
sure to see their already marginal incomes plunging due to the global
economic collapse.
Food riots were but one form of economic
violence that made its bloody appearance in 2008. As economic conditions
worsened, protests against rising unemployment, government ineptitude, and
the unaddressed needs of the poor erupted as well. In India, for example,
violent protests threatened stability in many key areas. Although usually
described as ethnic, religious, or caste disputes, these outbursts were
typically driven by economic anxiety and a pervasive feeling that someone
else's group was faring better than yours -- and at your
expense.
In April, for example, six days of intense rioting
in Indian-controlled Kashmir were largely blamed on religious animosity
between the majority Muslim population and the Hindu-dominated Indian
government; equally important, however, was a deep resentment over what
many Kashmiri Muslims experienced as discrimination in jobs, housing, and
land use. Then, in May, thousands of nomadic shepherds known as Gujjars
shut down roads and trains leading to the city of Agra, home of the Taj
Mahal, in a drive to be awarded special economic rights; more than 30
people were killed when the police fired into crowds. In October,
economically-related violence erupted in Assam in the country's far
northeast, where impoverished locals are resisting an influx of even
poorer, mostly illegal immigrants from nearby
Bangladesh.
Economically-driven clashes also erupted across
much of eastern China in 2008. Such events, labeled "mass incidents" by
Chinese authorities, usually involve protests by workers over sudden plant
shutdowns, lost pay, or illegal land seizures. More often than not,
protestors demanded compensation from company managers or government
authorities, only to be greeted by club-wielding
police.
Needless to say, the leaders of China's Communist
Party have been reluctant to acknowledge such incidents. This January,
however, the magazine Liaowang (Outlook Weekly) reported that layoffs and
wage disputes had triggered a sharp increase in such "mass incidents,"
particularly along the country's eastern seaboard, where much of its
manufacturing capacity is located.
By December, the epicenter
of such sporadic incidents of violence had moved from the developing world
to Western Europe and the former Soviet Union. Here, the protests have
largely been driven by fears of prolonged unemployment, disgust at
government malfeasance and ineptitude, and a sense that "the system,"
however defined, is incapable of satisfying the future aspirations of
large groups of citizens.
One of the earliest of this new
wave of upheavals occurred in Athens, Greece, on December 6, 2008, after
police shot and killed a 15-year-old schoolboy during an altercation in a
crowded downtown neighborhood. As news of the killing spread throughout
the city, hundreds of students and young people surged into the city
center and engaged in pitched battles with riot police, throwing stones
and firebombs. Although government officials later apologized for the
killing and charged the police officer involved with manslaughter, riots
broke out repeatedly in the following days in Athens and other Greek
cities. Angry youths attacked the police -- widely viewed as agents of the
establishment -- as well as luxury shops and hotels, some of which were
set on fire. By one estimate, the six days of riots caused $1.3 billion in
damage to businesses at the height of the Christmas shopping
season.
Russia also experienced a spate of violent protests
in December, triggered by the imposition of high tariffs on imported
automobiles. Instituted by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to protect an
endangered domestic auto industry (whose sales were expected to shrink by
up to 50% in 2009), the tariffs were a blow to merchants in the Far
Eastern port of Vladivostok who benefited from a nationwide commerce in
used Japanese vehicles. When local police refused to crack down on
anti-tariff protests, the authorities were evidently worried enough to fly
in units of special forces from Moscow, 3,700 miles away.
In
January, incidents of this sort seemed to be spreading through Eastern
Europe. Between January 13th and 16th, anti-government protests involving
violent clashes with the police erupted in the Latvian capital of Riga,
the Bulgarian capital of Sofia, and the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius. It
is already essentially impossible to keep track of all such episodes,
suggesting that we are on the verge of a global pandemic of economically
driven violence.
A Perfect Recipe for
Instability
While most such incidents are triggered by an
immediate event -- a tariff, the closure of local factory, the
announcement of government austerity measures -- there are systemic
factors at work as well. While economists now agree that we are in the
midst of a recession deeper than any since the Great Depression of the
1930s, they generally assume that this downturn -- like all others since
World War II -- will be followed in a year, or two, or three, by the
beginning of a typical recovery.
There are good reasons to
suspect that this might not be the case -- that poorer countries (along
with many people in the richer countries) will have to wait far longer for
such a recovery, or may see none at all. Even in the United States, 54% of
Americans now believe that "the worst" is "yet to come" and only 7% that
the economy has "turned the corner," according to a recent Ipsos/McClatchy
poll; fully a quarter think the crisis will last more than four years.
Whether in the US, Russia, China, or Bangladesh, it is this underlying
anxiety -- this suspicion that things are far worse than just about anyone
is saying -- which is helping to fuel the global epidemic of
violence.
The World Bank's most recent status report, Global
Economic Prospects 2009, fulfills those anxieties in two ways. It refuses
to state the worst, even while managing to hint, in terms too clear to be
ignored, at the prospect of a long-term, or even permanent, decline in
economic conditions for many in the world. Nominally upbeat -- as are so
many media pundits -- regarding the likelihood of an economic recovery in
the not-too-distant future, the report remains full of warnings about the
potential for lasting damage in the developing world if things don't go
exactly right.
Two worries, in particular, dominate Global
Economic Prospects 2009: that banks and corporations in the wealthier
countries will cease making investments in the developing world, choking
off whatever growth possibilities remain; and that food costs will rise
uncomfortably, while the use of farmlands for increased biofuels
production will result in diminished food availability to hundreds of
millions.
Despite its Pollyanna-ish passages on an economic
rebound, the report does not mince words when discussing what the almost
certain coming decline in First World investment in Third World countries
would mean:
"Should credit markets fail to respond to the
robust policy interventions taken so far, the consequences for developing
countries could be very serious. Such a scenario would be characterized
by... substantial disruption and turmoil, including bank failures and
currency crises, in a wide range of developing countries. Sharply negative
growth in a number of developing countries and all of the attendant
repercussions, including increased poverty and unemployment, would be
inevitable."
In the fall of 2008, when the report was written, this
was considered a "worst-case scenario." Since then, the situation has
obviously worsened radically, with financial analysts reporting a virtual
freeze in worldwide investment. Equally troubling, newly industrialized
countries that rely on exporting manufactured goods to richer countries
for much of their national income have reported stomach-wrenching plunges
in sales, producing massive plant closings and layoffs.
The
World Bank's 2008 survey also contains troubling data about the future
availability of food. Although insisting that the planet is capable of
producing enough foodstuffs to meet the needs of a growing world
population, its analysts were far less confident that sufficient food
would be available at prices people could afford, especially once
hydrocarbon prices begin to rise again. With ever more farmland being set
aside for biofuels production and efforts to increase crop yields through
the use of "miracle seeds" losing steam, the Bank's analysts balanced
their generally hopeful outlook with a caveat: "If biofuels-related demand
for crops is much stronger or productivity performance disappoints, future
food supplies may be much more expensive than in the
past."
Combine these two World Bank findings -- zero economic
growth in the developing world and rising food prices -- and you have a
perfect recipe for unrelenting civil unrest and violence. The eruptions
seen in 2008 and early 2009 will then be mere harbingers of a grim future
in which, in a given week, any number of cities reel from riots and civil
disturbances which could spread like multiple brushfires in a
drought.
Mapping a World at the Brink
Survey the
present world, and it's all too easy to spot a plethora of potential sites
for such multiple eruptions -- or far worse. Take China. So far, the
authorities have managed to control individual "mass incidents,"
preventing them from coalescing into something larger. But in a country
with a more than two-thousand-year history of vast millenarian uprisings,
the risk of such escalation has to be on the minds of every Chinese
leader.
On February 2nd, a top Chinese Party official, Chen
Xiwen, announced that, in the last few months of 2008 alone, a staggering
20 million migrant workers, who left rural areas for the country's booming
cities in recent years, had lost their jobs. Worse yet, they had little
prospect of regaining them in 2009. If many of these workers return to the
countryside, they may find nothing there either, not even land to
work.
Under such circumstances, and with further millions
likely to be shut out of coastal factories in the coming year, the
prospect of mass unrest is high. No wonder the government announced a $585
billion stimulus plan aimed at generating rural employment and, at the
same time, called on security forces to exercise discipline and restraint
when dealing with protesters. Many analysts now believe that, as exports
continue to dry up, rising unemployment could lead to nationwide strikes
and protests that might overwhelm ordinary police capabilities and require
full-scale intervention by the military (as occurred in Beijing during the
Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989).
Or take many of the
Third World petro-states that experienced heady boosts in income when oil
prices were high, allowing governments to buy off dissident groups or
finance powerful internal security forces. With oil prices plunging from
$147 per barrel of crude oil to less than $40 dollars, such countries,
from Angola to shaky Iraq, now face severe
instability.
Nigeria is a typical case in point: When oil
prices were high, the central government in Abuja raked in billions every
year, enough to enrich elites in key parts of the country and subsidize a
large military establishment; now that prices are low, the government will
have a hard time satisfying all these previously well-fed competing
obligations, which means the risk of internal disequilibrium will
escalate. An insurgency in the oil-producing Niger Delta region, fueled by
popular discontent with the failure of oil wealth to trickle down from the
capital, is already gaining momentum and is likely to grow stronger as
government revenues shrivel; other regions, equally disadvantaged by
national revenue-sharing policies, will be open to disruptions of all
sorts, including heightened levels of internecine
warfare.
Bolivia is another energy producer that seems poised
at the brink of an escalation in economic violence. One of the poorest
countries in the Western Hemisphere, it harbors substantial oil and
natural gas reserves in its eastern, lowland regions. A majority of the
population -- many of Indian descent -- supports President Evo Morales,
who seeks to exercise strong state control over the reserves and use the
proceeds to uplift the nation's poor. But a majority of those in the
eastern part of the country, largely controlled by a European-descended
elite, resent central government interference and seek to control the
reserves themselves. Their efforts to achieve greater autonomy have led to
repeated clashes with government troops and, in deteriorating times, could
set the stage for a full-scale civil war.
Given a global
situation in which one startling, often unexpected development follows
another, prediction is perilous. At a popular level, however, the basic
picture is clear enough: continued economic decline combined with a
pervasive sense that existing systems and institutions are incapable of
setting things right is already producing a potentially lethal brew of
anxiety, fear, and rage. Popular explosions of one sort or another are
inevitable.
Some sense of this new reality appears to have
percolated up to the highest reaches of the US intelligence community. In
testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February
12th, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, the new Director of National Intelligence,
declared, "The primary near-term security concern of the United States is
the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications...
Statistical modeling shows that economic crises increase the risk of
regime-threatening instability if they persist over a one to two year
period" -- certain to be the case in the present
situation.
Blair did not specify which countries he had in
mind when he spoke of "regime-threatening instability" -- a new term in
the American intelligence lexicon, at least when associated with economic
crises -- but it is clear from his testimony that US officials are closely
watching dozens of shaky nations in Africa, the Middle East, Latin
America, and Central Asia.
Now go back to that map on your
wall with all those red and orange pins in it and proceed to color in
appropriate countries in various shades of red and orange to indicate
recent striking declines in gross national product and rises in
unemployment rates. Without 16 intelligence agencies under you, you'll
still have a pretty good idea of the places that Blair and his associates
are eyeing in terms of instability as the future darkens on a planet at
the brink. |
|